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On November 5 , 1991 P e t i t i o n e r s f i l e d a Memorandum in t h e Utah 
Cour t of Appea l s ( cony e n c l o s e d ) # I n t h i s Memo, P e t i t i o n e r s C i t e d 
t h e same m a t e r i a l a s t h a t nov/ c o n t a i n e d i n t h e i r w r i t of C e r t i o r a r i , 
Sa id Memo v/as f i l e d i n Suppor t of Summary Reversal,_«__,__,, 
P e t i t i o n e r s , i n e s s e n c e , have P l e a d G u i l t y and a r e nov/ a t t e m p t i n g 
t o a p p e a l t h e i r Plea, w i t h o u t f i r s t r e c a n t i n g same. 
S i n c e no f u r t h e r p o i n t s have "been r a i s e d , o t h e r t h a n t h e s i n g l e 
c o n t e n t i o n r u l e d on by t h e Utah C o u r t of a p p e a l s , P e t i t i o n e r s V/rit 
shou ld be Di smis sed and R e s p o n d e n t s Case remanded t o t h e D i s t r i c t 
Cour t f o r f u r t h e r p r o c e e d i n g s . 
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PAUL VAN DAM (3312) 
Utah Attorney General 
LORENZO K. MILLER (5761) 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Respondents 
6100 South 300 East Suite 204 
Salt Lake Citv, Utah 84107 
Telephone: (801) 265-5638 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
ALLEN TIM HEFNER, i 
Petitioner/Appellant, i 
V. ! 
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, i 
et al., ! 
Respondents/Appellees. J 
: MEMORANDUM IN RESPONSE 
i TO SUMMARY REVERSAL 
: Case No. 910338-CA 
Respondents, by and through their counsel, Lorenzo K. Miller, 
Assistant Attorney General, hereby submit this memorandum in 
response to the Court's notice of sua sponte consideration of 
summary reversal, pursuant to the October 2, 1991 request. 
MATERIAL FACTS 
All facts material to this memorandum have been set forth in 
Respondents' previous memorandum in opposition to summary reversal, 
dated September 13, 1991. However, for the convenience of the 
Court the following facts are restated: 
1. The Board of Pardons has taken no action against Hefner 
since the 1986 parole revocation hearing. Resp's Memo, in Supp of 
Motion Dismiss 
in Mpi i I *), I MM i I inn years am! s^ven months after the 
last action < ' Mi« Boa id of Pardons, Hefner filed a petition for 
writ of habeas >rpus* 1*1- <-.i I l, i l M 
3. jctober 2, 1991, tills Court requested the parties to 
explain tii- C- urt why this case should not be sumnir ,t T < . 
"on the basi * f* <* 1 ho i.l al utr nt limitations was tolled during the 
period of imprisonment. Smith v. Cook, 803 P.2d 788, 790-91 (Utah 
1990)." 
ARGUMENT 
FOR THE REASONS STATED BELOW SUMMARY REVERSAL 
OF THE DISTRICT COURT'S DECISION IS APPROPRIATE 
IN THIS CASE. 
According »•?'• / P i iate 
Procedure, : •<,,,- • ,. s y summarily reverse a 
district court's decision i11 cases of "manifest error.1 For the 
reasons stated below such error exists i "> • in • n^'onl * f tint- case, 
and thensfop1, iin« cnii'! siioujii summarily reverse the district 
court's order dismissing the Appellant's habeas corpus petition. 
In Smith v. Cook, the petit lonor, f .
 i l^H a 
petition lui liiil.TiU'i coipus in the third district court on June 22, 
1987, claiming that * he his probation was unlawfully r^vnKnil m 
December i-i, 1^84. bUo t ) "The district 
2 
court dismissed the petition on several grounds, one of which was 
the application of the applicable statute of limitations for habeas 
corpus actions, Utah Code Annotated § 78-12-31.1 (Supp. 1987)- Id. 
at 789-90. 
On appeal, the Utah Supreme Court had to determine a threshold 
question of "whether Smith's two- and one-half-year delay in 
challenging the 1984 revocation hearing bar[red] his petition for 
habeas corpus in light of Utah's three-month statute of limitations 
on habeas corpus petitions." JId. at 790. In determining this 
issue, the Court determined that general provisions of section 78-
12-36 of the Utah Code Annotated (pre-April 27, 1987)
 f which 
contained a disability provision for persons incarcerated at the 
Utah State Prison, was controlling over the specific provisions of 
section 78-12-31.1. Id..1 Since Mr. Smith's claims arose prior to 
1
 The Court made its ruling upon the premise that any 
ambiguity in such a statute should be determined in favor of the 
criminal defendant. Smith, 803 P.2d at 791. Such a determination 
is questionable in light of the fact that Smith was the petitioner 
in a civil proceeding and not a defendant in a criminal action. 
See id. , n.10 (cases cited relate to criminal proceedings not civil 
cases); See generally, Busic v. United States, 446 U.S. 398 (1980); 
Chelsea Plaza Homes, Inc. v. Moore, 601 P.2d 1100 (Kan. 1979); 
Uniform Statutory Construction Act § 17; 73 Am. Jur. 2d, Statutes 
§ 257; Earl T. Crawfordf The Construction of Statutes § 167 (1940) 
(cases and materials stating that under statutory construction 
principals, in the event that there is an irreconcilable conflict 
between the general provision of one statute and the specific 
provision of another, the specific provision will control and be 
given precedence over the general provision); See generally. United 
States v. Yuqinovich, 256 U.S. 450 (1921); Thiokol Chemical 
Corporation v. Peterson, 393 P. 2d 391 (Utah 1964); Uniform 
3 
the April 27, 1987 amendments to section 78-12-36f the Court held 
that his habeas corpus petition was not barred by law. Id. 
The Supreme Court's conclusion is further supported by the 
exact language of the act from which the 1977 version of section 
77-12-36 was codified. The act specifically states that ff[t]he 
amendments in this act apply only to causes of action that arise 
after the effective date of this act ....•• See 1987 Laws of 
Utah ch. 19, § 6 (emphasis added); see also Smith, 803 P.2d at 790 
n.7. In the present appeal, all actions complained of by 
Appellant occurred prior to April 27, 1991. Thus all of 
Appellant's alleged causes of action "arose" prior to the effective 
date of the 1987 amendments. Therefore, Smith is directly 
applicable in this case and Appellant's claims are not barred by 
Statutory Construction Act § 18; 73 Am. Jur. 2d, Statutes § 255, 
256; Sands, Sutherland Statutory Construction § 23.09 (4th ed. 
1985) (cases and materials stating that under statutory 
construction principles, where th£re are tv70 acts that are in 
irreconcilable conflict, the latest legislative expression prevails 
and the prior law yields to the extent of the conflict). 
According to the preceding rules of statutory construction, 
the conflict between section 78-12-36, which was enacted in 1977, 
and 78-12-31.1, which was enacted in 1979, must be resolved in 
favor of the three month statute of limitation of 78-12-31.1 
because it is the latest expression of the legislature and it is a 
specific provision that will govern over the general disability 
provision of 78-12-36. To give preference to the general 
disability provision of 78-12-36 would leave the later provision of 
78-12-31.1 with almost no effect, because there is only a limited 
number of situations where a writ of habeas corpus may be available 
where no one is actually incarcerated. Smith v. Cook, 803 P. 2d 
788, 791, n.9 (1990). 
4 
section 78-12-31.1. Accordingly, the Court should reverse the 
district court's ruling that section 78-12-31.1 barred Appellant's 
cause of action. 
CONCLUSION 
The Court should summarily reverse the lower court's final 
order, as it relates to the applicable statute of limitations only, 
and should remand this case back to the district court for further 
consideration in light of Smith v. Cook, 803 P.2d 788 (Utah 1990). 
Dated this 5th day of November, 1991. 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Respondents 
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